Abstract | Movies, Jews, and Profits to Lose: Hollywood and the European Market Before World War II

 

The Return of the Kvetch

The recent spate of mainstream Hollywood films depicting Holocaust and Nazi imagery predictably has given rise to criticism and concern over how popular culture has appropriated the Holocaust, desensitized attitudes toward atrocity, or worse, accelerated revisionism.  The most recent kerfuffle involves Martin Scorsese's Shutter Island, which prompted New Philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy in a Wall Street Journal editorial to protest the film's conflation of Dachau and Auschwitz, criticize its "piles of candy-colored, Photoshopped cadavers" and ask whether we should "allow these doctored, computerized images of the Holocaust to banalize the most horrible, incomparable event of human history" (Lévy).

 

Ever since Theodor Adorno's 1963 dictum that to write poetry after Auschwitz would be "barbaric," the same narrow set of questions regarding what insights popular culture possibly could have to offer the Holocaust have reappeared with almost as relentless frequency as the films themselves.  Without making light of important questions regarding the representation of the Holocaust, some still wanting for attention, nearly 50 years later, these questions remain stuck within a familiar feedback loop.  Why didn't Hollywood do more to confront Nazism and the Holocaust?  Why now do we have to have so many films depicting the Holocaust?  Films such as Inglorious Basterds or Shutter Island afford renewed possibilities for the return of the Holocaust film kvetch.   

 

The kvetch in fact is a two-part complaint, with each part going hand in hand.  A less prominent but equally persistent corollary to the Holocaust film kvetch is the Jewish movie mogul kvetch.  The Jewish movie mogul kvetch maintains that before the 1960s, the movie moguls did not do enough or that they could have done more to appropriate the Holocaust.  More than a wish to impose the plethora of Holocaust films today upon audiences of the past, this "damned if the films do, damned if they didn't" cycle reveals a deeper paradox regarding popular attitudes toward popular culture.  Hollywood films then could have done more to combat Nazism and ultimately raise awareness of the Holocaust, but if they do now, they banalize.  A naive faith in popular culture hopes that films would have mobilized audiences, until those films get made and inevitably disappoint in their contemporary banality.

 

Tom Tugend's 2008 review of the documentary Imaginary Witness: Hollywood and the Holocaust evokes this deep ambivalence for popular culture.  "Hollywood movies and television have shaped the way most of the world perceives the Final Solution," the review begins.  Yet,

 

the studios, headed mostly by Jewish immigrants conflicted about their identity, generally treated the new Nazi rulers of Germany with kid gloves.  In this, they were driven as much by the bottom line (in the 1920s, Germany accounted for 10 percent of Hollywood's foreign profits) as by the Hays Code (Tugend).

 

The mantra, ladled like so much Jewish guilt, holds that while European Jewry perished, studio moguls were reluctant both to give up their overseas profits as well as to offend sensibilities, in the U.S. as well as abroad.  The charge is not dissimilar to the drowned daughter in Shutter Island, who returning from the dead, asks her father Teddy Daniels why he didn't save her. 

Given current concerns directed toward films like Shutter Island, whether Hollywood studios should have made more anti-Nazi films or raised awareness of the Holocaust sooner might not offer any easy answers.  Setting aside that question, though, we might consider stepping outside the kvetches to ask some additional questions.  First, what makes the identity narrative of Jews participating in Holocaust profiteering so compelling when discussing Hollywood?  Second, without dismissing either cravenness or greed as productive factors, how can explanations of Hollywood and its representations of Nazism and the Holocaust move beyond its obsession to anthropomophize this history?  And finally, how might both political economy and an awareness of actual audiences help augment the Hollywood Holocaust film kvetch to better make sense of Holocaust films and the meanings that circulate around them?

 

Identity Profits/Identity Politics

While one might glibly attribute the movie mogul kvetch to a more recent popular embrace of identity politics, the basic features of the kvetch were in place by the late 1930s.  Comparing “the Jewish hierarchy that controls the motion picture industry” to the Rothschild banking interests and their financing of Napoleon, “another madman of the world,” screenwriter E. E. Paramore, Jr. argued in a 1939 article that “wealthy picture Jews” were happy not to do “anything about the Nazi and Fascist persecution of their people except contribute relief funds” while “the rest of Hollywood” stood “ready and willing to fight the racial battles of their Jewish bosses” (MPPDA).  His opinion carried some weight, considering that he had co-scripted with F. Scott Fitzgerald a 1938 adaptation of Erich Maria Remarque's novel Three Comrades, which attributed a breakdown in German society after World War I to the rise of Nazism.

 

As Michael Birdwell documents, Welford Beaton similarly pleaded in a headline on the cover of the November 1938 trade publication The Hollywood Spectator that "the Jews who control our films... use the mighty voice of the screen on behalf of the Jews who are victims of maniac of Germany."  The very same issue, as Birdwell notes, also demands that Warner Bros. "put a stop" to the upcoming film Concentration Camp, since the Jewish movie moguls would "capitalize the tragedy" (qtd. in Birdwell 60).  The studio subsequently abandoned the project .  The anecdote exemplifies the double-bind of the Holocaust film kvetch: the Jewish movie moguls should have used the mighty screen on behalf of European Jewry, but any film that did so would only capitalize upon their suffering.

 

The preoccupation with Hollywood identity politics achieved added momentum with both the rise of explicitly Jewish-oriented films during the 1960s and academic multiculturalism of the 1990s.  As Les Friedman noted in 1982, Hollywood responded to a growing ethnic pride among Jews during the 1960s, fueled by a parallel interest in African-American cultural heritage (Friedman 174).  While mainstream features tended to downplay overt references to Jewish ethnicity, the independently produced The Pawnbroker (Allied Artists, 1964) became a touchstone for the modern American Holocaust film, in contrast to the oblique references of films such as The Diary of Anne Frank (20th Century-Fox, 1959).  As one of the earliest modern American independent films, The Pawnbroker in particular epitomized for many the failure of Hollywood to engage directly with both Jewish identity and the Holocaust.  In a 1972 essay, producer Roger Lewis recalled the reluctance of various studios to produce the film.  One executive tried to convince him to change the entire narrative and the main character of Sol Nazerman:

 

He doesn't have to have been in a concentration camp.  He doesn't even have to run a pawnshop.  He can run a saloon.  We'll make it a Western (qtd. in Baker 23)!

 

While academic multiculturalism offered an initial opportunity to critically engage with media stereotypes and gaps in representation in the 1990s, it also could inspire a refurbishing of an essentializing discourse that had been around for a long time.  Neal Gabler's 1988 An Empire of Their Own became a pivotal text in documenting a rags-to-riches story of Eastern European Jews who saw Hollywood as a place to work through their aspirations and anxieties concerning America.  The book offers a sympathetic if bittersweet portrait of Jewish identity among film industry executives, but its depiction of ethnic motivation has inspired less informed arguments as well.  With much unfavorable press coverage, diverse figures such as Leonard Jeffries, Jr., William Cash, and Marlon Brando all have refurbished older stereotypes of the venal Jew with an identity politics gloss to explain both Jewish power as well as a proliferation of ethnic stereotyping. 

 

One need not dredge up the culture wars of the 1990s to see that repeatedly holding movie Jews responsible, whether for perpetuating negative stereotypes or for not paying enough heed to Nazism, hasn't moved very far beyond an observation Leo Rosten first made in his 1941 Hollywood: The Movie Colony.  Without naming Jewish names, Rosten deftly makes clear how movie moguls get singled out as undeserving for the tremendous power they hold:

 

In politics, business, or trade, the leading personalities are believed to come up "the hard way."  They are assumed to have labored in their field, served long apprenticeships, climbed the high ladder rung by rung.  But the Hollywood producer is vaguely assumed to have jumped from a loft in Manhattan to a lodge in Brentwood in one fell swoop.  If you say "Knudsen," the images which appear encompass the total career-line...  If you say "Producer" the mind jumps from a humble beginning to a dazzling end-and all that took place in between is left blank (Rosten 15).

 

The Political Economy of Hollywood, Nazism and the Holocaust

In Hollywood and Anti-Semitism, I argued that the popular characterization of the Jewish movie mogul spoke to a number of different audiences and expressed a range of responses to a host of conditions associated with important shifts in modern American life. While this remarkably protean characterization targeted a number of conditions, the movie mogul stereotype could also conveniently mask deeper structures of modernity that were producing these conditions.  This characterization superimposed a Manichean worldview upon a complicated set of circumstances, personifying emergent ills of modern society in its convenient villain at hand: the greedy immigrant arriviste Jewish capitalist.

 

Characterizations since Gabler's 1988 book have implicated the Jewish movie mogul in Hollywood's allegedly anemic response to Nazism and the Holocaust.  Not as ham-fisted as earlier stereotypes, more modern depictions nonetheless share some similarities.  Like early depictions of the villainous mogul, the post-World War II image of the mogul overlays a simplistic portrait of a now tragic figure atop a complex set of institutional and organizational relationships.  The return of the kvetch ultimately locates its complaint with the individual.  In contrast, the political economy of the industry, when considered as part of an emergent process of globalization, gets beyond an emphasis upon individual behavior to explain what complex organizations do when they represent or don't represent things in the way that some in the present now demand.

 

Hollywood's response to Nazism and the Holocaust thus emanates from a set of industrial behaviors taking place amid an emergent process of globalization.  Not to the exclusion of day-to-day decisions made by individuals, this political economy and media globalization approach addresses a set of specific historical factors.  First, Hollywood and Weimar cinema were less allies than they were haplessly entangled through both economic and technological necessity.  Second, whatever the response of Hollywood to Nazism and eventually the Holocaust, this response did not occur in a vacuum.  Instead, this response was the result of pressures, both internal and external to the film industry.  Third, historians must consider the role of the U.S. Department of Commerce as well as the State Department in guiding the industry's stance on cooperation with Germany.  Finally, historical research must consider the complex function that the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association played  throughout this period, particularly in how it performed as the industry's research and development arm in dealing with domestic and foreign censorship boards.

 

Rather than exclusively a matter of maintaining profit margins, Hollywood's interests were hopelessly entangled with the German market, and that failure to sever ties with Germany might be the result of industrial procrastination and inertia.  Germany presented a difficult problem of early globalization that involved not just profits, but also culture as well as technology.  By January 1939, a New York Supreme Court decision in Epstein v. Schenck observed that "it has been impossible to make returns of profits from Italian and German subsidiaries" where a studio owned 25% or more of the company (Epstein v. Schenck).  Hollywood had invested in Germany, particularly with the Parufamet agreement in 1925 that allowed Paramount and MGM to loan the bankrupt German studio Ufa $4 million over 10 years in exchange for increased access to German theaters and markets.  However, various boycotts and sanctions limited the effectiveness of this agreement.  As Douglas Gomery notes, Hollywood had begun to boycott the German market in 1929 in a legal dispute over sound patents, despite their financial interests there.  Although the boycott lasted only six (6) months, separate patents agreements with countries and disputes over European quotas kept stalling or undoing attempts at a formal ratification of patents agreements with Germany until 1936 (Gomery 86-87).  Given these difficulties, and the ensuing complications over multiple language versions, the Parufamet agreement may have been less of a financial boon than it was one strategy Hollywood could use to forestall an international competitor from gaining a stronger foothold in the world market.

 

While Germany's estimated population itself was the largest of any nation in Europe, figures from the U.S. Department of Commerce show that in 1929 show that compared to Great Britain, France, or Spain, Germany's theatrical market was more middle-sized.  A devastating economic depression during the mid-1920s had set the German film industry economically and technologically behind.  During this same period, Great Britain, France, and Spain built huge movie palaces accommodating 3,000 or more people at a time.  Although Germany had 5,266 theaters, the largest total number of cinemas in Europe, the bulk of these housed less than 500 people and many were located outside of large metropolitan areas.  As Sabine Hake observes, Hollywood films held more appeal to liberal audiences in large metropolitan areas such as Berlin, as opposed to the conservative audiences in smaller towns (Hake 135-36).

 

Motion Picture Theater Statistics for Europe, 1929

Country	Est. Pop.	> 3K seats	2.5-3K	2-2.5K	1.5-2K	1-1.5K	750-1K	500-750	< 500	Total cinemas	Total seats	Inhabitants per seat
Great Britain	42.7 million	8	12	37	76	547	806	1,425	1,512	4,426	2,864,250	15
France and North Africa	53.1 million	2	2	20	53	267	356	927	2,031	3,113	1,977,000	21
Germany	62.5 million	0	0	9	17	106	207	484	4,443	5,266	1,876,600	33
Italy	40 million	0	0	3	12	62	78	750	1,500	2,405	1,063,800	37
Spain	21.3 million	9	9	12	77	183	612	455	700	2,062	1,469,000	14

(Canty 1929)

 

Clearly there was an economic motivation for Hollywood to maintain its interests in Germany, but economics alone do not explain this persistence.  Once all revenues from Germany had ceased by September 1940, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association in 1942 estimated their losses based on their pre-war annual earnings from each country.  Of their gross annual billings of $21.2 million from continental Europe, Germany accounted for $2.21 million, less than half the annual earnings from France ($4.7 million) or Italy ($5.27 million), and just slightly over Spain ($2.14 million).  Accounting for just 1.2% of annual production costs of $175 million, these relatively meager profits coupled with the additional trouble and costs of producing multiple language, dubbed, or subtitled versions of films do not make a compelling case for a profitable German market (Milliken, "English Matter").  Hollywood understandably devoted far more energy to pursuing lucrative English-speaking markets, given the number of large theaters and shared language.  In contrast to the German market making up approximately 10% of the pre-war European market, a 1942 letter from industry executive Barney Balaban estimates that Great Britain accounted for 55% of receipts for the entire foreign market (Balaban).

 

If profits were not a primary motivation for Hollywood to maintain its foothold in the German markets, then what did motivate the industry to maintain its interests there well into the 1930s? 

While Hollywood and the German film industry remained entangled through economics and sound technology, keeping films in Germany served key diplomatic interests as well.  The film industry long had struggled with how to depict topics of political and social relevance.  A popular perspective both within and from outside the industry held that films primarily operated as a vehicle of entertainment.  These fault lines between those who pushed for relevance and those who believed film should not stray from its central role as entertainer came to a head during the so-called Propaganda Hearings of September 1941, when isolationist senators hauled movie executives before Congress to testify on alleged Hollywood war-mongering.  Within days the Hearings collapsed, and the bombing of Pearl Harbor a few months later ensured that no such Hearings would reconvene.

 

"An Animated Sales Catalog"

While the official position of the industry's trade organization, the MPPDA, was that film was a universal vehicle to bring entertainment to the masses worldwide, internal industry communication acknowledged entertaining the masses was not void of a political agenda.  In assessing the new role that the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association should take in wartime, acting MPPDA foreign manager Carl Milliken argued that the American motion picture was "the product of and symbol of Democracy," presenting "the American way of life" in what he called "an animated sales catalog of American automobiles, farm machinery, typewriters, furniture, clothing, in fact most of the goods manufactured and exported by American business."  Since what foreign audiences "see they are inclined to want," the 1942 letter requesting favorable trade status with Mexico reminds the Chairman of the Tariff Commission "that the Axis dictatorships began eliminating American films from their own markets years before they declared war on the United States" (Milliken, Letter to Chairman).

 

That Hollywood could sell American ideals and lifestyles abroad struck a powerful between industry and government.  As Victoria de Grazia observes, the Department of Commerce Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade throughout the 1920s actively coached the industry on leveraging better trade agreements and securing monopolies abroad.  The Hoover administration had delegated authority to Will H. Hays in his capacity as head of the MPPDA to threaten American boycotts should other nations not comply with industry demands (de Grazia 59).  Both before as well as during World War II, this level of cooperation emphasized the political value of American film as entertainment in serving the ideals of democracy through its seemingly apolitical and social class-free promotion of consumerism.

 

Serving as the industry's Research and Development arm in addition to its various other lobbying roles, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association asserted its expertise in how to reach foreign audiences, as well as how it could anticipate potential problems the industry would face if it did become too overtly political.  Because it acted as an intermediary between the film industry and governments, either domestic or international, it also could serve as a clearinghouse for the vast and tangled network of various censorship regulations.  Any one film that indicted Nazism thus worked against the overall public relations strategy of the industry, since doing so ran counter to the standardized formula of effortlessly promoting American ideals through seamless images of a classless, consumerist society.  Such overt indictments risked leaving the industry open to charges of propaganda at a time when the MPPDA was engaged in public relations efforts to showcase Hollywood films as wholesome family entertainment with universal appeal.  Not following MPPDA advice in this regard meant not only alienating a key organization within the industry, but also squandering industry resources intended to help the studios better market their films to audiences.

 

While the strategy conflating Americanism and consumerism may have appeared seamless on film, any study of this period must acknowledge the lack of coherence in how the studios achieved this strategy, and how the MPPDA facilitated it.  As a complex organization, the film industry offered no unilateral response to the rise of Nazism.  How the MPPDA handled an early untitled script set in Germany suggests the kinds of negotiations that took place between the studios the MPPDA where a topical political issue was involved.  As Ruth Vasey has argued, Hollywood developed a particular set of representational strategies to dislocate the foreign from any specific nationality (Vasey, "Foreign").  In early October 1933, United Artists had an untitled script depicting "a Romeo and Juliet situation between a Jewish girl and a German boy who want to get married but are prevented by the ban on Jews."  According to an MPPDA report on productions in progress, Colonel Jason S. Joy of the MPPDA's West Coast office intervened, "pointing out the serious policy difficulties inherent in this setup."  The report concludes by promising that Joy and UA "are going to try to work out the story without bringing in the dangerous political angle" (Wingate 3).

 

While one can interpret this early maneuver as evidence of an informal and ongoing blackout of anti-Nazi content, it also remains consistent with an emergent vision of presenting what MPPDA's foreign manager Carl Milliken deemed "the product of and symbol of Democracy."  A powerful alliance between the film industry and the State Department buoyed this vision.  When Nazi Germany banned American studios and seized all of their property, the interim ambassador to Germany Leland Morris reported to Secretary State Cordell Hull that although the Nazis had economic motives for taking this action, the "political motives are prominent in this attitude, that is subtraction of American influence from occupied countries, substitution of direct and indirect German film propaganda, and the hardly concealed desire to exert censorship" over American films deemed anti-German (Morris).  What made Hollywood film valuable in this context was not the profit generated, but its influential image of America and the counterweight this image promised to exert against totalitarian ideology.

 

At least as important as the individual decisions of studio moguls with regard to their films and business interests, the MPPDA and its alliance with government entities also determined how Hollywood would address Nazism at the time, and by extension, how it would represent the Holocaust in future years.  One can certainly fault the leveraging of consumerist desires and implicit Americanism as a strategy to fight Nazism, and even the template that strategy has left for the representation of the Holocaust in popular culture.  Just as critics express legitimate concern over how the proliferation of Holocaust film may trivialize and banalize this history, though, the history of how Hollywood did or did not respond to Nazism is not without its own potential for trivialization and banality.  While trivializing the latter history has far less consequence than trivializing the Holocaust, any judgment of how popular culture treats the Holocaust is only as good as an understanding and appreciation of the complex forces at work, both then and now, busily producing that popular culture for an actual audience.

 

A Reception Studies Approach

There is no denying that Jewish identity played a role during this period.

Rather than operate as a discrete entity, Jewish identity gets negotiated between personal and public arenas.

Just as a context existed for how films addressed or did not address Nazism and the Holocaust at the time, a context also existed for audiences to imagine a Jewish Hollywood.

Any understanding of the films Hollywood did or did not make in response to Nazism and the Holocaust must take into account how audiences understood both these films as well as how they imagined the film industry.

 

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Movies, Jews, and Profits to Lose: Hollywood and the European Market Before World War II | top

This paper will draw upon primary historical research I have conducted for a larger project examining the response of the American film industry to the rise of Nazi anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.  In particular, the paper will examine the role that the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association (MPPDA) played as the public relations arm of the industry in both advocating on behalf of the industry abroad and to the U.S. State Department; but also in serving as a go-between for both the movie studios as well as various state, municipal, and international censorship boards.  Preliminary research shows that the MPPDA played an active role in discouraging Hollywood studios from forthrightly addressing Nazi anti-Semitism.  I come to this conclusion after reviewing primary historical materials from both the Will H. Hays Papers as well as the Production Code Administration papers.

 

While there clearly is evidence of Jewish personnel organizing against Nazi Germany shortly after Hitler came to power, both through political activities as well as through proposed scripts, the influence occurred within a complex maze of competing interests and alliances.  By the end of the 1920s, the relationship between U.S. and German film industries had become deeply entangled through both the growing international reach of Hollywood as well as a complicated set of patents and agreements for sound technology.  In addition, the State Department was actively encouraging the export of U.S. popular entertainment as a vehicle for foreign diplomacy.  Finally, the perception of Hollywood as an essentially Jewish place guided many of the decisions that the industry made during this period as it tried to improve its public image.

 

Contrary to the argument in some film histories that Hollywood failed to confront Nazism either through self-interest or in anticipation of future profits abroad, this paper tentatively will argue that the absence of anti-Nazi titles resulted at least in part from an alliance between the MPPDA and the U.S. State Department stressing the role of Hollywood to make and export entertainment films glorifying the American way of life.

 

Steven Alan Carr is an Associate Professor of Communication at Indiana University - Purdue University Fort Wayne (IPFW), a 2002-03 Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies Postdoctoral Fellow at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, and Co-Director of the IPFW Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies. He received his M.A. from Northwestern University in 1987 and his Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin in 1994, both in Radio-Television-Film. Reviews of his first book, Hollywood and Anti-Semitism: A Cultural History up to World War II (Cambridge U P, 2001), have appeared in Commentary, The Forward, The London Review of Books, The New Republic, and The Washington Post. His present project, which explores the response of the American film industry to the growing public awareness of the Holocaust, received an award from the National Endowment for the Humanities in 2002.

 

Works Cited | top

 

Archival

Balaban, Barney. Letter to Harry D. White. "Memorandum Submitted Pursuant to Request of Secretary of Treasury Re 'Blocked' Funds in Great Britain of the American Motion Picture Industry."  MPAA General Correspondence Files.  5 Aug. 1942.  Reel 7.  Margaret Herrick Library, Beverly Hills CA.

Canty, George R. "Motion Picture Theater Statistics for Europe." Ed. Specialties Division Motion Picture Section, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce, 1929.

M[illiken], C[arl] E. "The English Matter." MPAA General Correspondence Files.  10 Mar. 1942.  Reel 7.  Margaret Herrick Library, Beverly Hills CA.

[Milliken], Carl E.] Letter to Chairman, Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission, Washington DC. MPAA General Correspondence Files.  1 May 1942.  Reel 7.  Margaret Herrick Library, Beverly Hills CA.

Morris, Leland.  Telegram to Cordell Hull.  30 Oct. 1940.  Foreign Relations of the United States.  http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/.  Accessed 16 Mar. 2010.

MPPDA. Press Summary for 19 Jan. 1939. ts. pt. 2, reel 22. The Will Hays Papers, Frederick MD.

Wingate, James.  Letter to Will H. Hays.  5 Oct. 1933.  The Production Code Administration Papers.  Reel 6.

 

Book

Baker, Fred.  Movie People: At Work in the Business of Film.  New York NY: Douglas, 1972.

Birdwell, Michael E.  Celluloid Soldiers: Warner Bros.'s Campaign against Nazism.  New York NY: New York U P, 1999.

Friedman, Lester D.  Hollywood's Image of the Jew.  Ungar Film Library.  New York NY: Ungar, 1982.

Hake, Sabine.  Popular Cinema of the Third Reich.  Austin TX: U of Texas P, 2001.

Southard, Frank A. American Industry in Europe. The Evolution of International Business, 1800-1945. London ; New York: Routledge, 2000.

 

Journal Article

Gomery, Douglas. "Economic Struggle and Hollywood Imperialism: Europe Converts to Sound." Yale French Studies.60 (1980): 80-93.

Grazia, Victoria de. "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960." The Journal of Modern History 61.1 (1989): 53-87.

Ulf, Jonas Bjork. "The U.S. Commerce Department Aids Hollywood Exports, 1921-1933." Historian 62.3 (2000): 575-88.

Vasey, Ruth. "Foreign Parts: Hollywood's Global Distribution and the Representation of Ethnicity." American Quarterly  (1992): 617-42.

---. "Beyond Sex and Violence: "Industry Policy" And the Regulation of Hollywood Movies, 1922-1939." Quarterly Review of Film & Video 15.4 (1995): 65-85.

 

 

Legal

Epstein v. Schenck, 35 NYS 2d 969, 1939.  Lexis-Nexis.  Accessed 14 Mar. 2010.

 

Newspaper/Magazine Article

Lévy, Bernard-Henri. “Hollywood's Nazi Revisionism.” The Wall Street Journal 5 Mar 2010. Web. 8 Mar 2010.

Tugend, Tom. “How Tinseltown Shaped the World’s View of the Holocaust.” Review of Imaginary Witness: Hollywood and the Holocaust (2004; Shadow, 2007).  The Jewish Journal 3 Apr 2008. Web. 8 Mar 2010.